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The Decision to Reactivate a First-Generation




In March 1994, Armenia and Russia signed a bilateral nuclear
cooperation treaty in which the countries agreed to reactivate the
Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant (MNPP), a first-generation Soviet
facility near Yerevan, Armenia. The facility was closed for safety reasons
in 1989, following an earthquake in Armenia. This would be the first
time a nuclear plant would be reactivated after so long a period of
disuse. The decision to reactivate the plant was opposed by countries in
the region, by the Group of Seven (G-7) countries and by countries of
the European Union.1 Opposition is based on safety concerns,
specifically, about seismic risks and, more importantly, risks related to
facility design characteristics (the plant has no containment facilities to
prevent the spread of radioactive material in the event of an accident).
A variety of factors influenced the controversial decision to reopen.
The decision was prompted by a complex interaction of political, social,
economic and environmental factors that combined to create
conditions overriding technological considerations that caused
reactivation to be so overwhelmingly opposed by other countries.
Specifically, ethnic conflict, turmoil and warfare in the region have
resulted in social and economic paralysis in Armenia. Those conditions,
with associated environmental problems, have prompted a decision that
virtually everyone agrees is not warranted by technological
considerations.
* Dr. Gleason is Professor of Decision Sciences in the College of Business
Administration, US WEST Technology Fellow and Fellow in the Center for Health
Policy and Ethics, Creighton University. He received his B.S. (mathematics) and
M.B.A. from the University of Missouri at Kansas City and D.B.A. from the Indiana
University Graduate School of Business.
1 Armenia Determined to Reopen Controversial Reactor, Reuters, May 8, 1994,
available in SK News Digest.
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In light of significant safety concerns, and worldwide opposition to
reactivation of the MNPP, why would the Armenian government do
so? This paper examines a variety of factors which combined to yield
the chaotic conditions that prompted the 1994 MNPP reactivation
agreement between Armenia and Russia. Several conceptual/theoretical
frameworks regarding industrial crises, organizational disasters, and
stakeholder behavior are discussed. These qualitative frameworks
provide a basis for understanding the evolution of the reactivation
decision. A quantitative decision-analytic model which provides insights
regarding the reactivation decision process is also examined.
The qualitative frameworks are shown to have implications
regarding the real-world operationalization of the decision-analytic
model; the implications suggest the need for a reappraisal of our
understanding of how the quantitative model is applied in a decision
process. Because the terms "risk" and "uncertainty" are defined
differently in various academic fields, it should be noted that the
terms are used synonymously in much of this discussion.
Conditions In Armenia
The former Soviet republic of Armenia is a small landlocked
country bounded by Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iran.
Approximately one-third of the population of 3.7 million lived in
Yerevan, the capital city.2
Ethnic rivalries, separatist movements, rebellion and even
Georgian/Armenian mafia activities have created turmoil in the region.
The most significant problem is the war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. This
undeclared war, which began in 1988, had resulted in 20,000 deaths
and one million refugees by 1994. 3 It has created significant social
and economic hardships in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Georgia, which borders Armenia to the north, is a nation in chaos.
Separatist movements spawned rebellion and internal warfare causing
governmental instability and collapse. Georgia's current government is
2 Armenia National Institute of Health, Armenian Public Health Report (1994)
3 Jon Auerbach, In a Corner of Former USSR an Ethnic Conflict Rages on,
Boston Globe, April 21, 1994, at 14; Lawrence Sheets, Azerbaijan says Armenians
Blocking Refiigee Return, Reuters, May 23, 1994, available in, SK News Digest.
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skeptical of Russian efforts in the region. These conditions are
exacerbated by Azerbaijani activities directed against Armenia on
Georgian territory, including continued pipeline sabotage and railroad
bombings. For example, during January and February 1994, the gas
pipeline to Armenia from Georgia was blown up twice, and the railway
was blown up five times.4 The Mafia, which is heavily involved in
gasoline sales, is the suspected instigator of much of the sabotage that
results in reduced flows of gasoline from Georgia to Armenia. 5
Long-standing enmity exists between Armenia and Turkey, as a
result of activities (described by the Armenians as "the genocide")
directed against Armenians by the Ottoman Empire. During 1915-16,
an estimated one million Armenians died or were killed during forced
deportation by the Turks. Presently, Turkey is engaged in continuing
attempts to quell rebellion by Kurdish rebels. Turkey also supports
Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia. Turkish support
has included an embargo on Armenia.
Finally, Iran, to the south of Armenia, has a myriad of problems.
Despite the fact Armenia is a Christian country, Iran and Armenia have
a relatively good relationship.
While the general chaos in the region has had a negative effect on
social and economic conditions in Armenia, the most significant impact
on those conditions derives from the war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia has always been
dependent upon imports for a significant amount of its food and for all
of its oil and natural gas. 6 Armenia is heavily dependent upon natural
gas; gas is the primary source of energy for residential and industrial
needs and for the generation of electricity. Before the disintegration of
the Soviet Union, two pipelines from Turkmenistan that pass through
Azerbaijan were the primary sources (providing 80%) of natural gas for
Armenia. 7 Because of the war, Azerbaijan imposed an embargo on
4 Armenian Assembly of America, Department of Emergency Situations Report,
Daily News Report From Armenia, April 4, 1994.
5 Armenian Nuclear Power: Better than Cold, The Economist, April 15, 1994, at
54.
6 Raymond Bonner, War, Blockade and Poverty "Strangling" Armenia, The
New York Times, April 16, 1994, at 3.
7 Richard Giragossian, The Economic Effects of Azerbaijan's Blockade of
Armenia, The Noyan Tapan Highlights, May 14, 1994; see alo The Economist,
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Armenia. 8 The embargo has limited fuel supplies reaching Armenia.
The source of the minimal supply of fuel (only 20% of Armenia's
needs) is a gas pipeline through Georgia from Turkmenistan. 9 The
supply of fuel from Georgia is erratic at best, due to pipeline sabotage.
The shortage of fuel has been devastating to Armenia. As a result of
energy shortages, industry operated at 30% capacity in early 1994.10
A limited number of shops were operating, and severe shortages of
goods existed. 11 During the first four months of 1994, consumer
prices increased 450%.12 In April 1994, when the Central Bank
removed month-long controls from the Armenian currency (the dram),
the value of the dram dropped 22% in one week, suggesting an
annualized inflation rate of 1200-1300%. 13
The harsh conditions have resulted in severe problems of
emigration. Emigration estimates range from 500,000 during the three
years preceding the Metsamor reactivation agreement 14 to 750,000 in
the year preceding the agreement. 15 Emigration, whatever the true
numbers, is partially offset by an influx of 305,000 refugees. 16
Finally, the lack of energy sources exacerbates conditions in a
country that still has not recovered from the 1988 earthquake in
northern Armenia. That earthquake killed more than 25,000 people,
left 503,000 people homeless and destroyed seven major cities. 17
Serious, unrepaired damage from the earthquake is still evident.
The winters following the imposition of the Azerbaijan energy
embargo were devastating. The severe winter conditions have resulted
supra note 5.
8 Richard Balmforth, Armenia Determined to Reopen Controversial Reactor,
Reuters, May 8, 1994, available in SK News Digest.
9 Giragossian, supra note 7; see also The Economist, supra note 5.
10 Bonner, supra note 6.
11 Armenia Assembly of America, 305,000 Refugees in Armenia, Daily News
Report From Armenia, March 25, 1994.
12 Suren Karapetian, Economic Survey, The Noyan Tapan Highlights, May 14,
1994.
13 Anahit Khacharrian, Economic Situation in Armenia, The Noyan Tapan
Highlights, April 22, 1994.
14 Bonner, supra note 6.
15 The Economist, supra note 5.
16 Armenian Assembly of America, supra note 11.
17 Russia, Armenia Sign Accord to Restart Nuclear Plant, UPI, March 21, 1994,
available in SK News Digest.
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in massive cutting of forests for firewood (1.5 million trees were cut
during the winter of 1992-93), to the extent that the future of
Armenian forests,' which cover 13% of its land, is threatened. 18
In addition, Lake Sevan, the pride of Armenia, has been
significantly drained to provide hydroelectric power. The Ministry of
Nature and Environmental Protection reports 957 million cubic meters
of water were drained in 1992, and another 1,517 million cubic meters
in 1993.19 During the first quarter of 1994, nearly 400 million cubic
meters of water were drained from Sevan. Experts have suggested that
the lake soon will become a marsh if draining continues. 20
In light of regional turmoil, degenerating social and economic
conditions in Armenia and continuing damage to the country's
environment, the Armenian government made a decision to embark on
the reactivation of a first-generation Soviet nuclear power plant.
The Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant
The Metsamor (or Medzamor) Nuclear Power Plant (MNPP), also
known as the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANNP), is
approximately 40 kilometers from Yerevan. The MNPP is a first-
generation Soviet plant capable of producing 880 megawatts of
electricity. 2 1 The twin reactors were commissioned in 1976 and
1980.22 The VVER-440 pressurized light water-cooled reactors were
built in the early 1970's and are among the oldest of their design.2 3
Consequently, the reactors present risks related to design
characteristics. They were constructed according to long-outdated
18 Rem Ananikyan, Tourist Attractions in Armenia (1989); see also, Balmforth,
supra note 6; Desperate Nation Wants To Revive Reactor Older than Chernobyl,
Omaha World-Herald, Nov. 23, 1993, at 3; Regula Heusser-Markun, Survival in
Armenia, Swiss Review of World Affairs, Feb. 1994, at 16; The Economist, supra
note 5.
19 Sevan Suffers from Electricity Production, Aragil Electronic News Bulletin, May
27, 1994.
20 Omaha World-Herald, supra note 18; see also, This Year 400 Million Cubic
Meters of Water Drained From Lake Sevan, Noyon Tapan Highlights, April 22,
1994.
21 Omaha World-Herald, supra note 18; see also, Armenia to Restart Nuclear
Plant, UPI, April 22, 1994, available in SK News Digest.
22 UPI, supra note 21.
23 The Economist, supra note 5.
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Soviet safety standards, and they have no containment facilities - that
is, no concrete containment domes to prevent the escape of radioactive
material in the event of an accident.2 4 These risks are exacerbated by
seismic-related risks.
The MNPP was closed following an earthquake near Yerevan. 25 It
was the first operating nuclear plant to be decommissioned in the Soviet
Union. 26 The MNPP is thought to be located on an earthquake fault,
and it was the concern about potential earthquake damage that resulted
in the decision to close the facility in early 1989.
The Armenian government claims the seismic characteristics of the
facility have been upgraded in recent years and the facility could
withstand any earthquake. 27 Specifically, the head of the Armenian
nuclear energy authority has claimed that the facility was designed to
withstand earthquakes measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale. 2 8 More
recently, the director of the MNPP, also indicated that the plant could
withstand a 9.0 earthquake.29
The cost of reactivation was estimated to be $70 million,
approximately half of which would pay for the uranium. 30 As part of
the reactivation efforts, Russia would provide nuclear fuel, equipment
and 560 specialists to reactivate the facility. However, the reactivation
of the MNPP presents still other risks related to the handling and
disposal of nuclear waste. Azerbaijan, for example, has expressed
concern that nuclear waste would be buried on occupied territory.
Opposition to the Rectivation: Safety Risks
All countries in the region, the G-7 countries and the countries of
the European Union have expressed opposition to the reactivation of the
plant. 3 1 Major concerns about the facility have been expressed by
24 Omaha World-Herald, supra note 18; see also UPI, supra note 21.
25 The Economist, supra note 5.
26 UPI, supra note 17.
27 Nuclear Power Plant Will be Started Up, Aragil Electronic News Bulletin,
March 5, 1994.
28 UPI, supra note 21.
29 Medzamor Can Endure a 9 Point Quake, Asabarez-On-Line, June 18, 1996.
30 The Economist, supra note 5.
31 Balmforth, supra note 8; see also, Armenia Determined to Reopen Contro-
versial Nuclear Reactor, SK News Digest, May 6, 1994.
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Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has called on the International Atomic Energy
Agency to investigate the ecological, military and political consequences
of the reactivation. 32
The G-7 countries and the European Union countries have cited
safety concerns in their continuing opposition. For example, a
spokesperson for the U.S. embassy in Yerevan has stated that the U.S.
believes the design of the Metsamor plant is inherently unsafe. 3 3 Even
the Armenian Deputy Prime Minister for Energy admitted the plant
"will never be brought into line with Western safety standards."34
Certainly, issues related to safety risks may be the subject of
disagreement. For example, although various nations have expressed
concern regarding seismic safety, Armenia claims that seismic-safety
risks are inconsequential. However, perception is reality, and the
perceptions of seismic safety risks by various countries cannot be
significantly modified by the assertions of Armenia that the MNPP
poses no such risks.
Concerns about risks related to design characteristics and
operational safety may be less subject to disagreement. However,
challenges to those concerns could be raised, by comparing the
reactivation decision to the Soviet decision to continue to operate the
undamaged reactors at Chernobyl. Thus, an important question may
be: Are there factors related to the reactivation that may present more
risk than the continued operation of the Chernobyl reactors? As noted
earlier, the MNPP reactivation is the first time in history that a nuclear
reactor has been reactivated after so long a period of disuse. The
continued operation of Chernobyl reactors is a distinctly different
undertaking. Society has no experience with such an undertaking;
consequently, those involved cannot be expected to consider all the
possible consequences of the reactivation. Perrow, for example, argues
safety procedures cannot possibly deal appropriately with the plethora
32 Bakou is Worried by Re-Opening of ANPP, Aragil Electronic New Bulletin,
April 4, 1994; see also, Azerbaijan Protests Reopening of Armenian Power Plant,
Armenian Information Service Daily News Summary, March 28, 1994; Azerbaijan
on Prepared Launch of Armenian Nuclear Power Plant, SK News Digest, March 25,
1994.
33 Epigraph: When Your Feet Hurt, Remember the Old Shoes, AP News Wire,
March 17, 1994; see also, Balmforth, supra note 8.
34 Id.
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of possible interactions that lead to system failures in high-risk
technologies. 35 In fact, Perrow raises a number of issues related to
safety risks with nuclear power.
Risks Related to Nuclear Power
A premise of the concern over safety risks is the greater risk of a
catastrophic incident than would: (1) the activation of a nuclear power
plant constructed in compliance with state-of-the-art knowledge and
technology in an industrialized country, or (2) the continued operation
of undamaged reactors at Chernobyl. The premise is based on several
facts, including: (1) the MNPP was closed for safety reasons following
a devastating earthquake in the area; (2) this is the first time in history
that a plant has been reactivated after such a lengthy period of disuse;
and (3) the MNPP is a first generation facility which was originally
constructed according to long-outdated Soviet safety standards. Thus,
our discussion has assumed heightened danger in the specific case of the
MNPP, and there has been no discussion of general risks related to
nuclear power. While a detailed examination of the MNPP in the
broader context of these general risks is well beyond the scope of this
paper, it may be useful to briefly discuss a few of these issues.
In considering the potential for accidents arising from the use of
high-risk technologies, Perrow groups the technologies into three
categories. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons comprise the category
of systems "that are hopeless and should be abandoned because the
inevitable risks outweigh any reasonable benefits." 3 6 Perrow bases his
discussion primarily on experience with nuclear facilities in
industrialized nations, but the issues he raises are perhaps more
worrisome when considered from the MNPP perspective.
Perrow argues that the limited operating experience we have with
nuclear facilities is insufficient as a basis for claims of safety.3 7 In the
case of the MNPP, we have no experience with reactivation of a facility
after so long a period of disuse. 3 8 The MNPP reactors incorporate a
first-generation design even older than the Chernobyl RBMK reactors
(the other basic reactor design produced in the former Soviet Union).
35 Charles Perrow, Accidents in High Risk Systems Technology 9 (1994).
36 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents 304 (1984).
37 Id.
38 Id.
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Moreover, the MNPP was constructed according to out-dated safety
standards. The VVER-440 reactors at the MNPP are pressurized water
reactors (PWRs) that differ from Western models in several respects,
including lower ratings and higher heat intensities in the cores. There
are only eight such reactors in the former Soviet Union, and they have
been described as a "largely obsolete model".3 9 More specifically,
Kalinin observes:4 0
The VVERs fall far short of Western PWRs. In general,
they are inferior in safety, life span, thermal intensity in the
reactor core, and the efficiency with which fuel is used. In
addition, VVER fuel must be enriched to a higher
level.. .The greater safety of Western PWRs comes mainly
from their doubled concrete containments and much more
sophisticated and reliable control systems.
...The safety of (newer Soviet design) reactors has been
much improved. The last version of Soviet safety regulations
was quite close to the international rules. Unfortunately,
only one in four nuclear power units in the former USSR,
meet these standards.
Serious construction problems with various nuclear plants are
detailed by Perrow. 4 1 Construction involved in the MNPP
reactivation also has the potential to yield serious problems. These
derive from two major sources: the Soviet work ethic and the growing
level of corruption in Armenia. Under the Soviet system, everyone was
guaranteed employment. The legacy of that system is the failure to
recognize that a job has an objective. Workers believe simply going
through the motions associated with a job is satisfactory; they are
indifferent to the achievement of a purpose. Clearly, this work ethic
could be detrimental to the quality of construction activities associated
with the reactivation. Moreover, the growing level of corruption, Mafia
influence and bribery has the potential to seriously impact construction
activities related to the reactivation.
Perrow4 2 also discusses the potentially serious impact of trivial
events in high-risk systems. Despite detailed rules and procedures
39 Alexander V. Kalinin, Secrets of The Soviet Nuclear Complex, 31 IEEE
Spectrum 32 (1994).
40 Id. at 36-7.
41 Perrow, supra note 36.
42 Id.
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related to the operation of a nuclear facility, it is unrealistic to assume
procedures will be developed for all potential problems. The potential
for unrecognized problems in the reactivation of early-generation
technology, such as the MNPP, is troublesome, especially in light of the
work-ethic. If the objectives related to the development of safety
procedures are not fully appreciated, then the resultant safety
procedures might be more limited than they should be.
Finally, Perrow examines a factor that has received little attention
with respect to the MNPP: the fuel cycle, which includes the entire
cycle from mining of uranium to waste disposal. The potential for
problems within this cycle is sobering.4 3 Sources of potential problems
range from Mafia influence and corruption to transportation safety.
The last is exacerbated in an environment characterized by
deteriorating infrastructure and war-related terrorist activities.
Decision Alternatives
Efforts to deal with the worsening economic conditions could take
many forms. However, beyond the fact that the set of alternatives
considered in a given decision process is often too limited,4 4 there are
other reasons to believe the set of alternatives considered in this case was
not particularly large.
Armenia considers itself isolated, its borders shared by malefactors.
That mentality can severely limit alternatives that might have been
considered in attempting to deal with its energy-related problems.
Moreover, the legacy of the Soviet Union influenced the decision
process. For example, the Soviet system produced highly educated
scientists with strong theoretical training. However, it virtually ignored
fields such as management science and industrial engineering.
Consequently, the body of decision-making knowledge is virtually
unknown in former Soviet states. This lack of decision-making
knowledge can affect the development and analysis of alternatives.
Accordingly, the decision process was more heuristically than
analytically based. Heuristic processes considerably reduce the time and
effort needed to analyze and rank-order a large number of alternatives.
4 3 Id.
44 Ralph Keeney, Using Values in Operations Research, 42 Operations Res. 793
(1994).
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Moreover, heuristic processes eliminate the need to devote considerable
effort to the analysis of contingencies. 4 5 For example, the satisficing
approach is a heuristic approach in which the goal is to make a
satisfactory decision (a "good enough" decision) in a reasonable time,
rather than an optimal decision. 4 6 Satisficing, therefore, may be
considered to be an effort to optimize the decision process, rather than
an effort to determine an optimal solution.4 7 Consequently, the
reliance on heuristic processes may have resulted in considering a
limited number of alternatives.
Obvious alternatives span the spectrum of those that might have
been considered, ranging from do-nothing to reactivating the MNPP.
Others would have been between these. We will focus on three in
attempting to develop an understanding of why the reactivation
decision was taken.
The first, do-nothing, is to continue as in the past and accept the
economic and social strife caused by the energy blockade. Citizens will
continue to destroy forests to survive winters. The short-term result of
is to virtually destroy the country's forests. In the long term, the
country would then have to deal with the host of known environmental
effects of forest depletion and the potentially unknown effects of such
depletion in Armenia. Furthermore, because of the limited amount of
forest land, this alternative could be expected to provide only short-
term, inefficient relief. Moreover, after the forests are destroyed,
Armenia will again be facing the same decision, but with one less
alternative. This first alternative, therefore, may be viewed as a "slow
death" alternative.
The second alternative would require government action: rely more
on hydroelectric power generated by draining Lake Sevan (the Sevan
alternative). However, there has been significant ecological damage
caused by earlier draining. Even under optimistic conditions, continued
draining of the lake could exacerbate already-significant ecological and
environmental damage. Moreover, with continued draining, the lake is
45 Perrow, supra note 36.
46 James March & Herbert Simon, Organizations (1958); see also, Herbert Simon,
Economics, Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution (1992); Herbert
Simon, Models of Man (1957).
47 Frederick Hillier & Gerald Lieberman, Introduction to Operations Research
(1986).
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expected to be a marshland in the near future, so this alternative, like
the first alternative, provides only short-term benefits with significant
long-term costs. Thus, this second alternative may also be viewed as a
slow-death alternative.
Finally, a third alternative also requires government action:
reactivation of the MNPP (the reactivation alternative). This alternative
has the greatest potential for severe environmental damage to the entire
region. The deputy environmental minister has stated: "Only crazy
people would think of reopening a nuclear plant that was closed because
it was dangerous." 4 8 However, under optimistic conditions, there will
be no catastrophic "incident." Consequently, after years of Soviet rule,
followed by the major economic and social devastation of the post-
Soviet era, this alternative offers the hope of avoiding the slow death of
the previous two alternatives.
In light of the major safety concerns, and the overwhelming
worldwide opposition to the reactivation of the MNPP, what would
cause the Armenian government to choose the reactivation alternative?
To answer that question, several qualitative conceptual/theoretical
frameworks regarding industrial crises, organizational disasters and
stakeholder behavior are discussed. A quantitative decision-analytic
framework which provides insights regarding the reactivation decision
process is also examined, and relationships between the qualitative and
quantitative frameworks are explored.
Conceptual/Theoretical Frameworks
If the concerns of those opposed to the reactivation of the MNPP
were to be realized in the context of a major accident, such an accident
could be expected to cause significant damage to human life, the
environment and the social structure. These effects are consistent with
industrial crises as discussed by Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller and
Miglani, who note that such crises often occur in "environments of
economic crisis characterized by insufficient growth, unemployment,
fiscal deficits, budgetary and competitive pressures on individual
organization and an inadequate industrial infrastructure." 4 9 Since all of
48 Omaha World-Herald, supra note 18.
49 Paul Shrivastava et al., Understanding Industrial Crises, 25 J. Mgmt. Stud. 285,
287 (1988).
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these characteristics are evident in Armenia, the Shrivastava et al.
conceptual framework for industrial crises may provide a useful basis
for developing an understanding of the evolution decision process,
particularly from the perspective of the Armenian government.
Industrial Crises
In societies which are involved in rapid industrialization, such as
Armenia, the legitimacy of the government is based on its ability to
properly administer and control the economy. A rationality crisis occurs
when the state is unable to properly manage economic growth, and
extended rationality crisis may lead to a legitimacy crisis in which the
government loses the support of the population. A legitimacy crisis can
then lead to a motivational crisis which is evidenced by a decline in
moral values and a lessened commitment to accepted societal order.50
All of these types of crises are evident, in Armenia; consequently, the
activities of the current government are a source of controversy and
dissatisfaction. Under these conditions, it is understandable that the
government would be attracted to a "quick fix" which would be
expected to provide for the energy needs of the citizens and the needs
of the economic base which is involved in fledgling efforts to survive in
a competitive environment.
Shrivastava et al. identify a number of defining characteristics of
industrial crises: (1) triggering event, (2) significant damage to the
populace and the environment, (3) significant economic losses, (4)
significant social costs, (5) causes of crises, (6) involvement and conflict
between multiple stakeholders, (7) crisis response and (8) crisis
resolution and the impact on the extension of crises. 5 1 A detailed
discussion of the relationship between these characteristics and a
potential accident pursuant to the MNPP reactivation is beyond the
scope of this paper. Yet, many will be evident from earlier discussion.
Several characteristics, deserve more discussion (including the issue
of multiple stakeholders which is discussed in more detail below). The
last two characteristics, crisis response and crisis resolution, also may be
considered from the perspective of precursors to the reactivation
50 Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (1975); see also, Shrivasta et al., supra
note 49, at 286.
51 Id.
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decision. That is, the reactivation decision may be considered to be an
attempt to respond to, and resolve, another crisis - the social,
economic and environmental crisis caused by a lack of energy. Crisis
response is an attempt to reduce the severity of destruction and social
disruption, and to obviate future crises of a similar nature. Moreover,
attempts to resolve a crisis typically focus on mitigating its effects. 52
Accordingly, the government's reactivation decision may be considered
to be an attempt to respond to the current crisis resulting from a lack of
energy. The do-nothing and Sevan alternatives will not be as effective as
the reactivation alternative in terms of mitigating the effects of the
current crisis. Moreover, they will not obviate future crises of a similar
nature.
However, Shrivastava et al. note that crisis response typically focuses
on symptoms and seldom deals with the original causes. 5 3 This is
certainly true in the Armenian case. Accordingly, the response to and
the resolution of a crisis can exacerbate the original problem.
Unfortunately, the reactivation decision could eventually lead to
problems of significantly greater severity than the current problems.
Stakeholders
The various stakeholders affected by the MNPP decision differ in
terms of their cosmological perspectives; that is, they differ in terms of
their social organization, cultural biases and risk interpretations. 5 4
Douglas and Wildavsky consider cultures along two dimensions (group
and grid) and use group/grid analysis to explore the relationship
between group culture and group attitudes regarding risk.5 5 Based on
high and low group, and high and low grid categories, four cultures are
identified, each with distinct cosmologies and rationalities; three of
these cultural rationality groups (hierarchical, market and sectarian) are
of interest in the Armenian case. Gephart et al. 56 note that "each
52 Paul Shrivastava, Bophalh Anatomy of a Crisis (1987); see also, Shrivastava et al.,
supra note 49, at 293.
53 Id.
54 Robert P. Gephart, Jr., The Textual Approach: Risk and Blame in Disaster
Sensemaking, 36 Acad. of Mgmt. J. 1465 (1993); see also, Robert P. Gephart, Jr., et
al., Cultural Rationalities in Crisis Sensemaking:. A Study of Public Inquiry into a
Major Industrial Accident, 4 Indus. Crisis Q. 27 (1990).
55 Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk Culture (1982); see also, Mary
Douglas, Natural Symbols (1970).
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cosmology and associated rationality leads to unique interpretations of
events, to particular actions and to selection of certain risks." In trying
to make sense of accidents, disasters and crises, the various groups often
have divergent interpretations of events. 57
A brief examination of the cultural rationalities of three broad
stakeholder groups (the Armenian government, the Russian interests
and the Armenian population) provides further insights into the
evolution of the decision. The culture of government typically exhibits
hierarchical rationality. There are multiple goals to satisfy a variety of
stakeholders. Decision-making often occurs in response to problems;
that is, it is reactive rather than proactive. Rules, procedures and
sanctions are used to control social behavior. Risks threaten the
hierarchy, and the origins of the risks are typically external to the
group. Hierarchies are willing to accept large future risks in their efforts
to resolve a current problem. 5 8 Accordingly, given the political threat
to the government which is inherent in the energy crisis in Armenia, it is
not surprising that the government would decide to reactivate the
MNPP. The large future risk is acceptable to resolve the current energy
problems. Moreover, from the perspective of a government, the
reactivation alternative is better subject to control by rules, procedures
and sanctions than are the other alternatives. That is, threats to the
hierarchy can be best managed by reactivating the MNPP and
establishing and enforcing rules, procedures and sanctions related to the
operation of the facility. It should be noted, Perrow argues safety
procedures cannot deal appropriately with the plethora of possible
interactions that lead to system failures and accidents related to high-
risk technologies. 59 Yet, Perrow notes that "since catastrophes are rare,
elites feel free to populate the earth with these kinds of risky systems."
Market rationality focuses on profit-seeking. Tradeoffs are
unavoidable, and tradeoffs between safety and profits often result in a
willingness to accept higher safety risks to obtain greater profits. Market
stakeholders expect the hierarchy stakeholders to limit unnecessary
56 Gephart et al., supra note 54, at 33.
57 Robert P. Gephart, Jr., Managing the Meaning of a Sour Gas Well Blowout: The
Public Culture of Organizational Disasters, 2 Indus. Crisis Q. 17 (1988)
58 Gephart et al., supra note 54.
59 Perrow, supra note 35.
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regulation of market activities.60 Accordingly, Russian trade interests,
which are advanced by the decision to reactivate the MNPP, may be
viewed from the perspective of market rationality. The inherent safety
risks are acceptable to Russia in attempting to achieve market-oriented
goals. Moreover, the bilateral agreement between Russia and Armenia
ensures that Russia will have considerable input regarding evolving
Armenian safety regulations that might tend to reduce Russian profits.
Sectarian rationality is exhibited by the populace. Sectarian
rationality is characterized by informal norms and difficulty in
achieving decisions (because there is a need for concurrence of others
regarding the nature of risks). 6 1 Accordingly, opposition of the
populace to the reactivation decision, especially in a society that only
recently emerged from communist control, would evolve slowly and
would be fragmented in nature, due to the various sub-stakeholders in
the population of stakeholders.
There is another factor, the availability heuristic,6 2 that may
explain the populace's acceptance of the reactivation decision; this
factor can be expected to have an impact on the government's decision.
The availability heuristic suggests that people tend to evaluate issues on
the basis of the most available cases (that is, cases which occur more
frequently, thereby making them easier to recall). Rather than basing a
decision on the results of a complete analysis of all relevant cases
(including low-probability cases), there is a tendency to rely on recent
experiences or on more common experiences - the most available
experiences. Accordingly, recent experiences would have greater impact
on decisions than would the potential for a nuclear crisis(the probability
of which, psychologists suggest, would be underestimated via the
availability heuristic).
60 Gephart et al., supra note 54, at 39.
61 Id.
62 M. Granger Morgan, Probing the Question of Technology Induced Risk, 18
IEEE Spectrum 58 (1981); see also, Perrow, supra note 36; Paul Slovic et al.,
Rating the Risks, 21 Envt 14 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic For Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive
Psychol. 207 (1973).
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A Decision-Analytic Framework
Daft considers organizational environments along two dimensions:
the simple-complex dimension and the stable-unstable dimension. 6 3
In simple environments, only a few external elements influence the
organization; in complex environments, many external elements have
impact on the organization. In a stable environment, there is little
change over time; in an unstable environment, abrupt changes can
occur. This two-by-two scheme results in a framework for identifying
the level of environmental uncertainty.
Uncertainty
Uncertain environments are those in which insufficient information
prevents the precise determination of future (or even current)
conditions; that is, decision-makers are unable to determine, with
certainty, what will occur. Complex-unstable environments exhibit high
uncertainty, and the organization must be loose, adaptive and
decentralized. 6 4 Burns & Stalker define such management systems as
organic.65 On the other hand, simple-stable environments exhibit low
uncertainty, and the organization is characterized by rules, procedures
and hierarchy, with centralized decision-making, 66 Burns & Stalker
define such management systems as mechanistic.67
Note the inconsistency between the Armenian environment and the
organization of the Armenian government. A mechanistic system (best
suited for simple-stable environments characterized by low uncertainty)
is attempting to respond to a complex-unstable environment
(characterized by high uncertainty which is best managed by an organic
system). Under such conditions, it would be unusual to find that
formal, well-defined and well-accepted decision processes are used.
Moreover, as noted previously, the Soviet educational system ignored
fields such as management science. Accordingly, it is doubtful that the
reactivation decision process was based on a formal decision analysis.
63 Richard L. Daft, Organizational Theory and Design 75(1992).
64 Id.
65 Tom Burns & George Stalker, The Management of Inovation (1961).
66 Daft, supra note 63.
67 Burns, supra note 65.
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Decision Analysis
The decision process related to attempts to deal with the highly
uncertain environment can be considered from a decision-analytic
perspective. First, some fundamentals of decision theory relevant to
cases of uncertainty will be reviewed. 6 8 For simplicity, a discrete
alternative space and a discrete state-of-nature space will be considered
(that is, there will be a distinct number of alternatives and a distinct
number of states of nature). Since conditions are uncertain, the
outcomes of the various alternatives relative to a number of potential
states of nature (that is, the future events that might occur) must be
considered. Furthermore, because of insufficient information in the case
of uncertainty, the decision-maker is unable to obtain meaningful
probabilities related to the occurrence of the various states of nature.
Suppose the payoff (more specifically, the consequences evaluated
in terms of values) 69 associated with each alternative/state-of-nature
combination has been determined. An optimistic approach to
decision-making is one in which the best payoff for each alternative is
identified, and then the alternative which yields the best of the set of
best payoffs is chosen. This approach is optimistic because only the best
payoff for each alternative is considered; other payoffs are ignored. The
decision-maker assumes that, regardless of the alternative chosen, the
state of nature that yields the best result will occur. The chosen
alternative yields the overall best payoff, and the approach which yields
that decision is referred to as the maximax payoff approach.
Conversely, a pessimistic approach to decision-making is the worst
payoff for each alternative is identified, and the alternative that yields
the best of the set of worst payoffs is chosen. This approach is
pessimistic because only the worst payoff for each alternative is
considered; other payoffs are ignored. The decision-maker assumes
that, regardless of the alternative chosen, the state of nature that yields
the worst result will occur. The chosen alternative is the one which
yields the best of the set of worst payoffs, and the approach which
yields that decision is referred to as a maximin payoff approach.
68 David R. Anderson et al., Introduction to Management Science (7th ed. 1994);
see also, Barry Render & Ralph Stair, Jr., Quantitative Analysis for Management
(1994).
69 Keeney, supra note 44.
Gleason: The Decision to Reactivate Metsarnor 57
The decision process followed by the Armenian authorities may be
considered to be a dramatic example of an optimistic approach to
decision-making - an approach in which the chosen alternative is the
one that yields the best of the set of best results that potentially would
occur under the various alternatives (note that the best result may, in
fact, be reflective of the least evil). Specifically, government officials
and citizens alike may view the reactivation of the nuclear plant as the
alternative that, under optimistic conditions, will yield the best of the
set of least evil results.
Moreover, if the decision process is viewed as an example of an
optimistic approach, then results other than the best result for a given
alternative are not considered in the decision process; that is, only the
result associated with the most favorable state of nature for the given
alternative are considered. Because only the best result is considered, it
is assumed no accident will occur at the MNPP (that is, states of nature
related to significant MNPP accidents will yield unfavorable payoffs
which will not be considered because, under an optimistic approach,
only the best payoff is considered for each alternative). If the
reactivation of the nuclear plant is successful, living conditions in
Armenia will improve significantly in both the short-term and the long-
term. Furthermore, Lake Sevan and the nation's forests will be saved.
Of course, there is the risk that an accident at the MNPP could
result in a disaster. For that reason, reactivation may be viewed as a
"quick death" alternative. Unfortunately, after years of hardship, the
average Armenian may believe the potential benefits to society
outweigh the potential costs. More specifically, a "quick death" (in the
case of an accident at the nuclear plant) may be preferred to the slow
death offered by the other alternatives.
The willingness to accept reactivation is consistent with the
availability heuristic discussed earlier. Recent experiences with
horrendous winters may have had a greater impact on the decision than
the potential for a nuclear disaster; the impact of the former is more
available, whereas the impact of the latter is a low-probability event that
is less available. This view appears to be reflected in the results of a
public opinion survey conducted by the Armenian National Academy
of Sciences and the U.S. Information Service. One of the survey
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questions was: "Do you favor or oppose re-opening the Nuclear Power
Station at Metsamor?" Of 1200 respondents, 71% favored the
reactivation of the MNPP, 14% opposed it, and 15% indicated it was
difficult to answer the question.70
This view, that the reactivation of the MNPP, is the only true
option, is reinforced by statements of a number of Armenian officials.
For example, Armenia's Deputy Prime Minister for Energy stated: "At
this point, Armenia has no option, just no option." 7 1 Even the Minister
of Nature and Environmental Protection supported the reactivation.
She said the important question is whether Armenia will be kept
inhabitable only for plants and animals, or for humans as well.72 The
deputy environmental minister was most succinct: "our water is running
out, and we can't keep cutting down trees. So we simply have to choose
which catastrophe we want to risk." 73
Consistent with the availability heuristic, a major factor driving the
decision process is clearly identified by Moskovskie Novosti: 74 The
residents of Armenia "seem to have reached the point at which the
specter of a 'nuclear winter' frightens them less than a climatic winter."
Discussion
The decision to reactivate appears to have been driven by a variety
of considerations, among which technological ones played a minor role.
The complex interaction of the myriad of political, social, economic
and environmental factors to create conditions that overrode the
technological considerations provides an interesting example of
decision-making under desperation. However, the reactivation decision
which has been the subject of worldwide opposition is not particularly
surprising when viewed from the perspectives of several qualitative
conceptual/theoretical frameworks regarding industrial crises,
organizational disasters and stakeholder behavior. While it is doubtful
that the reactivation decision resulted from a formal quantitative
70 Questionnary: Public Opinion Survey, Noyan Tapan Highlights, May 6, 1994.
71 Bonner, supra note 6.
72 Heusser-Markun, supra note 18.
73 Omaha World-Herald, supra note 18.
74 Political Implications of Medzamor, Armenia Information Service Daily News
Summary, May 12, 1994.
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decision analysis, the decision appears to be consistent with one that
would result from an optimistic approach to decision-making under
conditions of uncertainty. Thus, the MNPP reactivation serves as a case
study that relates qualitative frameworks from various disciplines to the
quantitative decision-analytic framework.
Most textbook discussions of quantitative decision-analytic models
are based on presumptions that appropriate analyses have been
conducted. Discussions of optimistic, pessimistic and other approaches
to decision-making under uncertainty, permit one to choose between
various decision approaches, while being aware of the potential
drawbacks of a specific approach. Thus, the existence of a relatively
complete payoff structure is presumed in most discussions of decision-
analytic models.
Yet, the relationship between the qualitative frameworks and the
decision-analytic model suggests the qualitative frameworks have
implications regarding the real-world operationalization of the
decision-analytic model. Specifically, the qualitative frameworks
suggest the level of analysis required in real-world implementations of
optimistic decision-analytic models may be significantly less than
would be expected. That is, much of the analysis that would be
expected to be devoted to the development of the payoff structure,
based on textbook discussions of optimistic decision-analytic models,
may not be conducted in a real-world implementation of such a model.
We have seen the decision process in the case of the MNPP result in
a decision in which the chosen alternative yields the best of the set of
best results that potentially would occur under the various alternatives;
thus, it resulted in a decision which is consistent with an optimistic
approach to decision-making. While it is doubtful a formal decision-
analytic approach was used in support of the decision process, it is dear
that optimistic approaches under such conditions may result in analysis
processes that are significantly less rigorous than would be expected.
Since results other than the best results are not considered in the
optimistic decision process, only the result associated with the most
favorable state of nature is considered. Thus, analyses related to various
"bad" outcomes of the reactivation would not be conducted.
Although the MNPP decision is consistent with an optimistic
approach, we have seen such an approach yield a questionable decision.
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Accordingly, it is instructive to review the qualitative frameworks we
examined in order to identify concepts which seem to support the
adoption of an optimistic approach.
There are growing problems that may be viewed within the context
of rationality, legitimacy and motivational crises. 7 5 In attempting to
deal with a rationality crisis, it is understandable that a government
would be attracted to "quick fixes." Such "quick fixes" often can be
expected to be of an optimistic nature. Thus, there may be a tendency
to focus analytical efforts on favorable results and ignore the potential
for unfavorable results.
The response to an industrial crisis typically focuses on mitigating
the effects; that is, the focus is on symptoms, and the response seldom
deals with the elimination of the causes. 76 The focus on the mitigation
of effects encourages an optimistic approach, in which only the best
results for each alternative are considered. This type of focus suggests
too few alternatives may be analyzed, which is consistent with a concern
expressed by Keeney. 77
The various types of cultural rationalities also encourage optimistic
approaches to decision-making. 7 8 Government culture typically
exhibits hierarchical rationality, in which decision-making is reactive,
and in which risks that threaten the hierarchy are external to the group.
Since hierarchies are willing to accept large future risks in their efforts to
resolve current problems, 7 9 there will be a tendency to adopt
optimistic approaches to decision-making. Market rationalities, which
result in a willingness to accept higher safety risks to obtain greater
profits, reinforce this tendency to adopt optimistic approaches.
The Future
Technological advances have contributed to a world in which
traditional approaches to decision-making under risk/uncertainty are
not robust enough to incorporate the growing number of complex
75 Habermas, supra note 51; see also, Shrivastava et al., supra note 50, at 286.
76 Shrivastava, supra note 53; see also Shrivastava et al., supra note 50.
77 Keeney, supra note 45.
78 Douglas, supra note 56.
79 Gephart et al., supra note 55.
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interactions. Thus, public-sector decisions will, in the future, require
consideration of more global concerns. These decisions will require
greater emphasis on tradeoffs between short-term and long-term results
which incorporate a myriad of factors.
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there has been
increasing chaos within the former Soviet republics, besides a variety of
other regional conflicts around the globe. The Metsamor reactivation is
one of the first results of such a regional conflict, and the 21st century
can be expected to yield a growing number of similarly complex
decision-making situations. Consequently, the Metsamor decision may
prove to be a harbinger of increasingly complex decision processes
reflecting the growing interaction between technology and other
societal concerns. It can be expected that the growing technology bases
in countries whose infrastructures and societies are ill-equipped to
appropriately manage the technologies will lead to an increased number
and severity of crises and disasters related to the technologies.
Moreover, the dangers of nuclear technologies cannot be
understated. The illicit flow of nuclear materials from the former Soviet
nations, in conjunction with the flow of those materials resulting from
trade agreements between various countries, can be expected to
eventually lead to significant crises and disasters related to nuclear
technology. In fact, the risk of a nuclear incident is probably greater at
this time than during the Cold War. International agreements to
prohibit the flow of such materials cannot be expected to be particularly
useful in dealing with the problems related to access to nuclear
technologies and materials. Perhaps the next stage in attempting to deal
with such problems will be international agreements to provide
technical assistance to nations that receive the technologies (whether
legally or illegally) in an attempt to avoid potential problems arising
from their use. Such an approach would be similar to those used in
some countries for controlling problems related to drug use. Rather
than trying to prevent access, the focus is on mitigating problems
arising from those who have access.
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Epilogue
The reactivated MNPP began generating electricity in November
1995. On May 20, 1996, a spate of earthquakes began in Armenia -
more than 55 in less than one month, and many were of magnitudes of
5 and 6. Such activity was expected to continue through mid-July,
according to the Armenian Minister of Emergency Situations. Another
earthquake occurred near Yerevan two days before this epilogue was
written on July 8. In response to questions, the director of the MNPP
assured journalist that the MNPP could withstand earthquakes of
magnitude 9. 80
In June 1996, the U.S. pledged up to $6 million in aid to improve
the safety of the MNPP. The facility is to be shut down for at least 60
days beginning July 15 for refueling. Unfortunately, Lake Sevan is still
in serious ecological danger due to water drainage since 1991. A
number of recommendations have been made to restore the lake's
ecological system, including setting limits on water drainage for
purposes of power generation. 8 1
80 Medzamor Can Endure 9 point Quake, Asbarez-on-line, June 18, 1996.
81 Lake Sevan Water Level Cause for Ecological Concern, Asbarez-on-line, June 26,
1996.
